Henry R. Luce Lectures on
NETWORKS, LAWS, ACTORS
May 18th 2004, (Tuesday)
Olds-Upton 207
Program:
 |
4.10 - 4.15 | Péter Érdi: Introduction |
|
4.15 - 5.05 | Katherine
J. Strandburg (Assistant Professor of
Law, DePaul College of Law): Law
and the Theory of Networks: Is There A
Link?
Traditionally, United States law has focused its attention on individuals and their relationships with one another and the state. It has sought to provide incentives for socially beneficial behavior by individuals (treating even corporations as "persons"), to resolve disputes between individuals, and to regulate the behavior of individuals. While the last century brought increased legal recognition of the claims of individual members of large social groups defined by race, gender, and religion, it is only recently that United States legal scholarship has begun to focus on the important role that communities and more informal social networks play in determining and regulating social behavior. This talk will explore the potential contributions that the theory of networks might make to the analysis of law. While the talk will be more of an invitation to cooperative effort than a presentation of results, I will present some preliminary results of an application of statistical network theory to the patent system. |
|
5.05 - 5.20 | Coffee Break |
|
5.20 - 6.10 | Mark S. Mizruchi
(Professor of Sociology and Business Administration, University of
Michigan): Network Structure, Actor Centrality, and Power: A Model
and Simulation
For many years, network analysts viewed positional centrality as a source of social power. Laboratory studies of exchange networks have called the centrality-power link into question, however: under zero-sum exchange conditions, the ability of certain actors to directly exploit others has been found to account for power independent of actors' centrality. But most observers believe that in non-zero-sum communication networks, centrality should positively affect power. In this study, conducted with Blyden Potts, I examine the effect of centrality on power in a communication network involving group voting on political issues. Using a model in which actors' votes are determined by the strength of their initial positions and the social pressures to which they are subjected, we conduct computer simulations to examine the extent to which actors in various network positions achieve favorable political outcomes. The findings indicate that the link between centrality and power is highly contingent on the structure of the network. In networks with a central actor and an odd number of subgroups, central actors fail to dominate. In fact, in these networks, when peripheral actors are able to directly influence one another, the central actor becomes the least powerful in the network. In networks with a central actor and an even number of subgroups, however, the central actor dominates even in situations with connected peripherals. The highly contingent effect of centrality on power accords with the findings of exchange theorists who have studied power under zero-sum conditions. This raises questions about the nature of the distinction between communication and exchange networks. |
| Contact person: | Péter Érdi (tel: 337-5720) |