SAMPLE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION QUESTIONS

Philosophy of Law

 

  • What is the "Dismissive-Judgment" charge against natural law theory?  How does Aquinas' definition of law protect him against this charge?
  • What is Austin's definition of law?  What does H.L.A. Hart find objectionable about it?
  • What is H.L.A. Hart's definition of law?  What, according to him, is the appropriate way of understanding the relationship between morality and the law?  How might a sophisticated anti-positivist argue against this account?
  • What is Lon L. Fuller's argument for the so-called "inherent morality of law"?  Do you find his claim convincing that this alleged "inherent morality of law" provides defenses against the corruption of legal systems in fascist and totalitarian regimes?
  • In "The Model of Rules" and "Natural Law Revisited," Dworkin presents and defends what J. L. Mackie has called the "third theory" of law.  What is Dworkin's conception of law?  How does Dworkin understand the special responsibilities of judges, who must apply the law?  In "The Third Theory of Law," J.L. Mackie argues that Dworkin's account of law and jurisprudential determinacy is unsuccessful.  What are Mackie's arguments against the "third theory"?  Present your own arguments for or against Mackie's criticism.
  • In his article, "Civil Disobedience in the Modern World," Feinberg analyzes the grounds for civil disobedience in light of the debate between positivists and natural law theorists.  What is the issue of civil disobedience for Feinberg?  What conclusions does Feinberg reach in his discussion.  Give clear and concise expositions of his arguments and analyze their validity.
  • In his article, "Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies and Dworkin" and in Chapter 8 of Arguing About Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy, Altman analyzes CLS in relation to legal positivism, realism and Dworkinian jurisprudence.  Analyze Altman's account of CLS's attack upon Dworkin's position regarding legal determinacy.   What are the central arguments that CLS advances against Dworkin's model of legal determinacy?  Do you find CLS's arguments convincing?
  • In Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Andrew Altman presents three different ways in which CLS argues against the possibility of the liberal "rule of law."  What are the Patchwork, Duck-Rabbit and Truncation theses regarding legal determinacy?  How does Altman assess their significance for liberalism's insistence upon the neutrality of the legal system vis-a-vis political discord?  How might a CLSer respond?
  • In "Civil Rights Versus Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment," Thomas Grey argues that Stanford's free-speech code is a subtle document that appropriately balances concerns with civil rights and civil liberties.  First, give an exposition of Grey's argument for the type of university free-speech regulation we should be adopting, given our constitutional and juridical heritage.  Analyze our "Academic Freedom" policy statement in the terms Grey provides.  Is our code at Kalamazoo College a good one according to the criteria Grey provides?
  • What do you think of Grey's claim that "the civil-rights approach embodies a project, which is to be carried on within a framework constituted by the civil-liberties approach?  Would Dworkin agree, and which of his central distinctions does Grey's distinction invoke?  How might an advocate of CLS refute Grey's claim?
  • In his article, "Civil Disobedience in the Modern World," Feinberg analyzes the grounds for civil disobedience in light of the debate between positivists and natural law theorists.  What is the issue of civil disobedience for Feinberg?  What conclusions does Feinberg reach in his arguments and do you find such arguments sound?
  • In The Concept of Law, H. L. A. Hart presents and defends legal positivism. What is his account of legality, and how have subsequent philosophers argued against it?
  • The positivistic orientation to jurisprudence articulated by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law has been severely criticized by Natural Law theorists for failing to answer the question of how laws could be binding. How might one defend legal positivism against such arguments? Do you find this defense entirely plausible?
  • Explain how Lon Fuller secularizes Natural Law theory and assess the logical requirements of articulating a functioning system of laws he identifies preserves or undermines a normative orientation to law.
  • What type of Natural Law theory is at work in Martin Luther King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail?
  • David Luben interprets Martin Luther King as defending a Hermeneutic understand of the U.S. legal system. How might Malcolm X be seen as rejecting this hermeneutic ideal of a shared historical topoi?
  • What is Dworkin’s argument against the system-of-rules legal positivism championed by H. L. A. Hart? To what extent does Dworkin’s argument succeed in discrediting legal positivism?
  • Compare and contrast Legal Hermeneutics and Dworkinian jurisprudence. In what sense is Dworkin a hermeneuticist?
  • What is the debate surrounding Dworkinian jurisprudent and Critical Legal Studies, and what do you think we should learn from it?
  • What is Critical Legal Studies, and does it succeed in its critique of the very idea of the rule of law?
  • What is liberal neutrality, and how have philosophers argued against it? Do you find such critiques convincing?
  • Does Habermas’s Dicourse Theory of law remainder the CLS/Dworkin debate?
  • What is Habermas’s critique of Luhman’s system-theoretic approach to law?
  • What is Habermas’s critique of Dworkin’s normative orientation to legal validity?
  • How does Habermas propose to move beyond what he takes as the false dichotomy between factual and normative approaches to the study of law? Does he succeed in arguing that each presupposes the other?
  • What is Habermas’s distinction between justification and application discourses, and to what degree does this distinction capture CLS concerns with social power?
  • Compare and contrast Lon Fuller’s and Jurgen Habermas’s accounts of “fidelity to the law”? Do found find their respective foci on logic and language helpful in understanding legal validity?