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How does Searle argue against Austin’s
classification of speech acts, and what alternative taxonomy of illocutionary
forms does he defend in its stead? Are you convinced that this taxonomy
adequately captures what we do by saying what we’re doing?
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What is Keith Donnellan’s distinction
between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions,
and how does Searle argue against it? What is the importance of this
issue for the philosophy of language?
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In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”,
Hilary Putnam mounts a powerful attack upon Fregean semantics. First,
what are his arguments, and what are the repercussions of this issue
for the philosophy of language.
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In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”,
Hilary Putnam mounts a powerful attack upon Fregean semantics. First,
what are his arguments, and how does Searle argue against them? Who
is right?
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In a series of provocative articles, Howard
Wettstein argues for what he now calls “The Direct Reference
Revolution.” How does he motivate this revolution, and do you
find it a definitive rejection of Frege’s claim that intension
determines extention.
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Moderate the debate between Kripke and Searle
on proper names. What, in you estimation, is the right way to understand
how proper names refer?
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What is David Kaplan’s distinction between
the “content” and “character” of terms? How
would Searle understand this distinction, given his distinction between
primary and secondary illocutionary intention, and do you find this
alternative analysis superior?
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How have traditional philosophers understood
metaphor, and what are the difficulties with these views?
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Famously, Paul Grice argues for a “modified
Occum’s razor” approach to ambiguity. Explain Grice’s
recommended strategy for analyzing ambiguity and assess its merits.
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In “The Pragmatics of What is said,”
Francoise Recanati argues against Sperber and Wilson’s argument
against the “Minimalist hypothesis” for distinguishing
what is said from what is implicated. How, ultimately, does Recanati
criticize the “Minimalist hypothesis”? Do you find his
alternative “Availability hypothesis” plausible?
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How does Habermas argue against Searle’s
taxonomy of illocutionary forms? Do you find his alternative taxonomy
plausible? Make sure to discuss “directive” or “regulative”
speech acts and what it means to understand them.
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Can Fregean semantics adequately account for
indexical expressions?
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In “Indirect Speech Acts” and
other articles, Searle offers an account of the inferential processes
involved in understanding speaker’s primary illocutionary goals
when the speaker does not literally or directly state them. First,
explain how Searle analyzes such inferential processes and discuss
the repercussions for the philosophy of language of this view concerning
the type of normativity such understanding involves.
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In such articles as “Literal Meaning,”
“The Background,” and “Metaphor,” Searle advances
a subtle theory about linguistic meaning and its dependence upon a
Background of skills and capabilities. Do you find his defense of
literal meaning plausible given the strong arguments marshaled by
contextualists?
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By carefully using the traditional resources
of speech act theory, explain what a “deconstructionist”
approach to semantic determinacy is.
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How does Quine argue for the indeterminacy
of translation thesis? Is this thesis to be understood as a critique
of semantic Platonism or literal meaning as such?
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How does Quine argue for the inscrutability
of reference thesis? Is this thesis to be understood as a critique
of the correspondence theory of truth or truth as such?
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The philosophy of language in 20th century
is defined, at least in part, by a growing appreciation that contextual
factors determine the content of what is said and thought. By reviewing
a few classic arguments, frame your position on the question of how
we should study language or intentionality.
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In Has Semantics Rested Upon a Mistake, Wettstein
argues for a Wittgensteinian understanding of meaning and reference.
Does this account support Kripke’s causal analysis of reference?
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How does Habermas argue against intentionalist
semantics (Grice), use theories of meaning (Wittgenstein), and truth-conditional
semantics (Frege)? Does his Neo-Wittgensteinian theory of meaning
in terms of rational acceptability work?
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Searle and Habermas have forcefully argued,
respectively, for and against the thesis that the philosophy of language
is a branch of the philosophy of mind. First, clearly identify the
key points in this debate and take a stand on this key question.
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Habermas’s claim that coming to an understanding
(Verstaendigung) is “the original telos of language use.”
Critically appraise the merits of this claim regarding linguistic
understanding.
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In Communicative Action and Rational Choice,
Joseph Heath argues against Habermas’s theory of meaning and
in this fashion rejects his account of social order. Do you think
that Habermas illicitly freights linguistic understanding with illicit
norms in the way Heath claims?
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Is Habermas’s distinction between illocutions
and perlocutions in The Theory of Communicative Rationality tenable?
Does his subsequent distinction between “weak” and “strong”
communicative action preserve or abandon the strong claims he makes
about understanding being the original telos of language use?
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Critically examine Putnam’s arguments
against causal theories of reference.
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What is the distinction between de re and
de dicto beliefs? Does this distinction really represent a definitive
break with the basic Fregean thesis that intension determines extention?
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How does Robert Brandom argue for the necessity
of singular terms, and how might this analysis square with Direct
Reference theorists?
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What is more primary, speech acts or conversations?
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Critically examine the debate between Derrida
and Searle on linguistic determinacy and argue for one position or
the other.
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Are there “conventional implicatures”?
